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ABSTRACT
We extend standard models of price pass-through across multiple layers of intermediaries in
a supply chain with imperfect competition to incorporate credit rationing. To test against a
standard model without credit rationing, we study the effects of a policy reform in Bangladesh’s
edible oils supply chain during 2011-12 which banned a layer of financing intermediaries. The
standard model predicts higher pass-through of international prices to wholesale prices after
the reform, while the credit rationing model predicts the opposite if the resulting credit contrac-
tion is strong enough. Evidence from a difference-in-difference estimation rejects the standard
model. Our estimates imply that the regulatory effort to reduce market power of financing
intermediaries ended up raising consumer prices by restricting access to credit of downstream
traders.
Keywords: Intermediary, Supply Chain, Market Power, Credit Rationing, Pass-through,
Edible Oils, Bangladesh;
JEL Codes: O12, L13, Q13
1 Introduction
The role of market power of trade intermediaries in earning high margins that unduly raise
consumer prices has frequently been a matter of public concern. Such concerns underlie argu-
ments for regulations, often taking extreme forms of outright bans on some intermediary layers,
and, in come cases, jail term and even execution of traders. For example,
“For my part, I wish every one of them (speculators) had his devilish head shot
off”. (Abraham Lincoln, quoted in Carpenter (1866, p. 84))
“For as long as we fail to treat speculators the way they deserve—with a bullet in
the head—we will not get anywhere at all”. ((Vladimir Lenin, 1964, p. 311).)
In 1958 private trades in onions futures were banned in Chicago; distrust of private traders
led to the establishment of marketing boards in many developing countries in 1950s and 1960s.
However, disappointing results with the marketing boards led to agricultural market liberaliza-
tion starting from the late 1970s. Lack of trust in middlemen traders in commodity markets
nevertheless remains widespread and deeply ingrained; the price spiral in international com-
modity markets in 2007-2008 brought their role back into focus. In 2011, the Bangladesh
government banned a layer of intermediaries called Delivery Order Traders (DOTs) in edible
oils distribution trade, out of a concern that their market power was primarily responsible for
the rising consumer prices since 2008. However, there is relatively little systematic evidence on
the effects of such policy actions. More generally, there is a paucity of literature on the role
of middlemen and price pass-through with imperfect competition in the context of developing
countries.
In this paper we argue that the standard models of pass-through in the literature pay
insufficient attention to the financing role of intermediaries. Specifically, if the financing in-
termediaries in a supply chain help relax quantitative credit constraints faced by downstream
traders, banning them can have dramatically different implications for pass-through and price
margins when compared to standard models of double marginalization of rents. We show this
in the context of a model of symmetric Cournot competition with given concentration at each
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layer. As in the recent work of Atkin and Donaldson (2015), a Bulow-Pfleiderer (1983) spec-
ification of downstream consumer demand generates explicit linear recursive expressions for
prices at each layer in the absence of any credit rationing.1 Pass-through rates are independent
of cost levels, and depend only on concentration at successive layers and the curvature of the
demand function. Removing an intermediate layer is equivalent to eliminating market power
at that layer, which raises pass-through and lowers the intercept term in the downstream price
equation. Extending the model to incorporate credit constrained downstream traders, and the
role of upstream intermediaries in alleviating these credit constraints, we show that the effects
of regulations can get reversed: if the credit rationing effect is strong enough, the pass-through
rate falls while the intercept term rises as a result of removing the financing intermediary layer.
We test these contrasting predictions using daily wholesale and retail palm oil price data
in Bangladesh spanning 2008-2013, a period which includes the drastic policy reform banning
financing intermediaries called delivery order traders (DOTs) from the market. We compare
estimated pass-through of shocks to import prices of crude palm (which constitutes 80% of oil
refining costs) before and after the reform (which lasted approximately one year starting July
2011). The main econometric issue with this before-after approach (henceforth B-A approach)
is that the estimated pass-through rates may be biased owing to the omission of other sources
of distribution costs when they are correlated with the oil import price. The direction of
the change in the pass-through rate estimated by the B-A approach is unbiased under the
assumption that the correlation between the omitted distribution costs and imported crude
price did not change as a result of the reform. However, the direction of bias in the change in
the intercept term cannot be assessed without making additional assumptions that are difficult
to verify directly. We deal with this problem in two ways. First, we check the sensitivity of the
B-A estimates and the direction of the omitted variables bias by including proxies for changes
in distribution costs such as diesel price and exchange rate. Second, and more importantly, we
develop a difference-in-difference strategy and compare changes in oil prices with the changes
in wheat prices, which is also imported and incurs similar distribution (transport and storage)
1Our benchmark model without credit rationing differs from Atkin and Donaldson (2016) by incorporating
financing intermediaries who provide low interest loans compared to banks. Moreover, we extend the standard
model to incorporate the consequences of credit rationing.
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costs, and for which the parallel trend assumption cannot be rejected.
In the B-A analysis, we find a substantial fall in the pass-through rate (from 80% to 68%),
statistically significant at the 5% level. Moreover, the estimated intercept term nearly doubled
(the difference being significant at the 1% level). The increase in the intercept was large
enough to make the net effect on consumer price positive. Consistent with the assumption of
positive correlation of distribution costs with crude import prices due to factors unrelated to
the reform, the B-A estimates are larger when we include proxies for distribution costs, and the
DiD estimates are larger than the corresponding B-A estimates. We check subsequently that
the DiD results are robust with respect to alternative specifications of oil import lags, duration
of the reform and the pre-reform period. The credibility of the DiD design is strengthened by
placebos for the timing of the reform and the affected commodity.
These results reject the double marginalization model of supply chains extended to include a
layer of financing intermediaries providing low-interest credit, and are consistent with the model
of credit rationing faced by downstream traders. The intuitive explanation is that the DOT ban
resulted in more severe credit constraints faced by downstream wholesale and retail traders,
resulting in a contraction in trade volumes which raised downstream prices. Moreover, the
tightening of credit constraints effectively lowered price elasticity of derived demand functions
faced by upstream refiners, resulting in higher refiner markups. These disruptions overwhelmed
whatever reductions in market concentration resulted from the elimination of the DOTs from
the market. This explanation is consistent with independent evidence from case-studies, as well
as data on aggregate crude import volumes which contracted sharply (at a time when import
prices were falling). It also helps explain why the reform was reversed, following pressure from
palm oil refiners who were struggling to oﬄoad their accumulating inventories.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides details of the institutional
setting of the palm oil supply chain in Bangladesh and the nature of the reform. Section 3
develops the theoretical analysis, followed by a discussion of estimation strategy in Section
4. Section 5 then describes the data and presents the empirical results. Section 6 discusses
possible competing explanations, while Section 7 discusses related literature. Finally Section 8
concludes.
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2 The Palm Oil Marketing Chain in Bangladesh and the
2011 Reform
2.1 Pre-Reform
We start with a brief description of the Bangladesh palm oil marketing chain before the DOT
ban in 2011; a more detailed discussion is provided in Uddin and Taslim (2010). As the reform
was effectively suspended by mid-2012, the current structure of the supply chain resembles the
way it was organized prior to the reform. The chain consists of four layers: refiners, delivery
order traders (DOTs), wholesalers and retailers. The refining segment is highly concentrated
with only 9 refiners, some of them have considerable excess capacity. The refiners import
crude palm oil from Malaysia and Indonesia and then refine it. While wholesalers can pick up
refined oil directly from the refiners upon paying cash, such direct transactions between the
wholesalers and the refiners are limited. The wholesalers mostly furnish a delivery order (DO) to
take oil delivery, a paper document representing an entitlement to a defined quantity. DOs are
purchased by DOTs from refiners, sometimes immediately after the crude oil is imported, and
sold later to wholesalers. There are approximately 300 DOTs divided between two principal
cities Dhaka and Chittagong, forming an intermediate layer between refiners and over 7000
wholesalers. Wholesalers mostly prefer to purchase through a DOT rather than directly from
a refiner for two reasons: the credit implicitly provided by a DOT, and DOTs buy in bulk
and get price discounts from the refiners part of which they can share with the wholesalers.
Estimates from a trader survey we conducted in 2013 shows that about 32 percent of quantity
transacted between the DOTs and wholesalers was on credit without collateral, based on long-
term relationships.
The DOTs buy DOs for oil deliverable by the refiner after a stipulated period of time
(usually 2 weeks). It is important to note that DOTs never take physical delivery of the oil:
they are pure financial intermediaries. This is helpful for our empirical analysis, as the banning
of DOTs cannot affect the distribution costs such as storage and transport costs directly. The
DOT layer interacts vertically with the refiners upstream and the wholesalers downstream. In
effect, they purchase refined oil from the refiners and re-sell it after a time lag to wholesalers.
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There are also some horizontal transactions among DOTs, representing arbitrage, specula-
tion or purchase by smaller DOTs from the large DOTs. The horizontal transactions among
the DOTs have evolved into something like an embryonic commodity exchange in Moulovibazar
in Dhaka and Khatunganj in Chittagong where speculators operate with the help of brokers,
primarily during upswings in the international market. Our post-reform data period how-
ever coincided with a downswing in the international market when activities in the secondary
(horizontal) DOT market were almost nonexistent.2 In our analysis, we focus on the pricing
implications of market power and credit rationing across vertical layers in a static framework,
and thus abstract from price dynamics, risk, or heterogeneity across traders within any layer.
2.2 The Reform
The policy reform focused on the DO layer of the market. The law banning DO (Delivery Order)
transactions and instituting SO (Sales Order) dealers in its place (i.e., Essential Commodities
Marketing and Distributor Appointment Order 2011) was passed on March 23, 2011. 90 days
were allowed to implement the policy change, implying that the directive implementing the law
came into effect on June 21, 2011.
It was argued by the government and popular media that in the DO system a few big
players exert disproportionate market power and manipulate the market by strategically buying,
holding and selling DOs. This layer was sought to be entirely eliminated in the new system,
in which wholesalers were expected to purchase oil directly from refiners. In the SO system,
new dealers were appointed for each “marketing area” (for example, upazila or municipality)
selected by the refiners, and a dealer is allowed to buy oil “commensurate with” the size of
the market. In total, 7388 dealers for edible oil were appointed by different refiners. While
wholesalers were principally expected to become the new dealers, it would have been difficult to
2The DO layer is not a futures market, because there is no settlement at the end of the day. Also, unlike a
futures contract, payment is made at the time of the DO contract, not at the delivery date. The fact that the
DOTs pay ahead of the physical delivery implies that the refiners effectively get short-term loans. In return,
the refiners provide storage for the oil, as the DOTs do not own any storage facilities. Thus the cost of storage
can be thought of as implicit interest rate on the short-term loan a refiner gets from the DOT. The DO is also
not a standard forward contract, because the stipulated delivery date is almost never enforced.
5
prevent previous DOTs from acquiring dealerships. This was the logic underlying the quantity
restrictions on the amount of oil that could be purchased by a dealer, so that even if an ex-DOT
became a dealer he would not be able to engage in bulk purchases and sales of SOs. Hence the
intent was to reduce market concentration within the supply chain.
However, the elimination of DOTs also meant disappearance of an important source of
credit for wholesalers. Refiners were unable to step in to fill this gap because they lacked the
information accumulated by the DOTs over decades. Accordingly, the wholesalers had to turn
to banks for credit to finance dealership deposits and purchase of SOs for oil from the refiners.
Many faced difficulty in obtaining sufficient credit. This made it difficult for the refiners to set
up a new network of SO dealers. City Group, one of the largest refiners which accounted for
nearly half of all new dealerships created, was forced to waive the required security deposits.
A related problem was the lack of storage among wholesalers, who were expected to pick up
refined oil earlier in the new system in the absence of the DOTs.
As a result of these problems, the wholesale-traders-turned-dealers were increasingly unable
to pay for the required oil, and refiners began to accumulate stocks beyond their desired level of
inventory. This prompted the refiners to look for alternative distribution channels; eventually
they went back to some of the large DOTs to return into the business and undermine the
new system. After approximately six months of the reform, the DOTs started to circumvent
the quantity restrictions imposed, with the government taking little initiative to enforce these
restrictions (presumably owing to pressure from refiners). This passivity set into motion forces
that pushed back the marketing system towards the old DO system; within a year or so the
old system was back in play.
3 Theory
We model a vertical chain with three layers: refiners, DOTs and wholesale traders (depicted
below respectively by i ∈ {r, d, T}). Although the edible oil supply chain also includes retailers,
we ignore them as the focus is on the effects of the elimination of the DOTs on wholesale prices.
So we assume that wholesalers sell directly to final consumers. Owing to its recursive structure,
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it is easy to extend the model to incorporate an additional fourth layer of retailers who sell to
final consumers. Indeed, the model with a retail layer reduces to the one developed below when
there are sufficiently many retailers that the market power at that layer is negligible.
We also abstract from product heterogeneity and horizontal asymmetries across traders at
each layer.3 Concentration i.e., the number of (identical) traders at each layer is exogenously
given: the number of traders in layer i is denoted as Ni. They engage in Cournot competition,
taking as given prices of the intermediate input they purchase from the layer above (which
determine their unit costs). We normalize units so that one unit of crude oil produces one
unit of refined oil. Besides oil costs, traders at level i incur costs Ci per unit: for refiners this
includes refining and storage costs; for wholesalers this includes transport, storage and other
distribution costs. Since the DOTs do not incur transport and storage costs, the per unit
distribution costs for them are likely to be small.
Production decisions and distribution flow vertically downwards. First, the crude oil import
price Pm is determined in the international market. Then refiners decide how much to import
and refine, taking the import price as given, but incorporating the effect of their quantity
decisions on the price at which they sell to traders one level below (the DOTs). This determines
total unit costs of traders at the next layer, who then decide their quantities, and so on.
The inverse demand function among consumers is assumed to take the Bulow and Pfleiderer
(1983) form:
PT (Q) = α− ηQδ; α, η, δ > 0 (1)
where PT denotes the price at which wholesale traders sell to consumers.
4
We now explain the role of credit, which arises from a time-lag associated with the refining
and distribution process. There are two dates: t = 0 and t = 1. At t = 0, the crude oil
is imported at price Pm, and DOs are sold by the refiners at price Pr to DOTs who in turn
sell them at price Pd to the wholesalers, and, finally, the wholesalers take delivery of oil from
3This is a reasonable assumption in our empirical application because there is little product differentiation
in the Palm oils market.
4An alternative to the Bulow-Pfleiderer demand specification is the constant elasticity demand, widely used
in the theoretical literature. A constant elasticity demand function implies a zero intercept in the pass-through
equation. The evidence rejects the null hypothesis of a zero intercept at the 5 percent significance level in all of
the pass-through regressions reported in this paper.
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the refiners and transport to the destination market. At t = 1 the refined oil is sold to the
consumers by the wholesalers at price PT . All distribution costs of DOTs and wholesalers are
also incurred at t = 0.5 DOTs are not constrained with respect to the amount of credit they
have access to, and incur the lowest borrowing costs compared to refiners and wholesalers.6
Being informal lenders with specialized expertise in financing, they can lend at a cost of id per
taka, which is lower than (or equal to) the rate ib charged by banks. This difference arises owing
to lower transaction costs (screening and loan collection expenses) they incur compared with
formal financial institutions. Hence DOTs provide loans to wholesalers to cover the time-lag
between t = 0 and 1. Wholesalers finance their working capital needs at t = 0 by borrowing
from DOTs. They need to borrow Pd+CT for per unit of oil purchased. These loans are repaid
at t = 1 after they receive cash payments from consumers.
Loans are subject to moral hazard: a wholesaler could decide not to repay a loan at t = 1.
Loan default is punished by lenders with a severity depending on who the lender is. DOTs
are able to impose more punitive sanctions on defaulters than banks, due to their access to
punishments not limited to purely legal routes. The maximal pecuniary cost of sanctions
imposed by DOTs and banks respectively are denoted by Rd, Rb with Rd > Rb. We treat
these sanctions as given.7 Consequently the borrowing of any given wholesaler has to satisfy
the constraint that the amount of repayment due to a DO trader cannot exceed Rd.
DOTs compete with one another (and with banks) in the market for lending to wholesalers.
For simplicity we assume they compete over loan contracts in Bertrand fashion, thereby end up
5In addition to the transport costs incurred by the wholesalers, these may include worker wages which are
paid in advance at t = 0. The only role of this assumption is to simplify the notation; the cost expressions need
to be adjusted if distribution costs are incurred at t = 1.
6This is motivated by the evidence from a survey of the edible oils market in Dhaka and Chittagong in 2013
reported in Emran et. al, (2015). See also the discussion in Taslim and Uddin (2010). Among other factors,
black money generated by tax evasion is likely to be an important source of DOT finance which cannot be
deposited in banks to earn interest income. In some cases, the religious injunctions against earning interest
income may reduce the opportunity costs of own funds for DOTs, especially among the ethnic Bihari DOTs in
the Dhaka market.
7It is easy to extend the model to settings where sanctions are endogenous, e.g., in a dynamic setting where
sanctions involve cutting off access to credit and the oil market in future. DOTs could engage in such collective
punishments as in Kandori (1992) or Greif (1993): all DOTs could refuse to sell DOs or lend to any wholesaler
who defaults on a loan with any DOT. If prices are stationary, the cost of these sanctions imposed on defaulters
will depend on prices, which will alter the expression for credit ceilings derived below. This complicates the
analysis without affecting the results qualitatively.
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earning zero profits in equilibrium. This implies that wholesalers would be able to borrow at
an interest rate of id. However, owing to the moral hazard problem the size of their loan would
be subject to a ceiling given by Rd
1+id
. This in turn translates into a ceiling on how many DOs
the wholesaler can purchase; q DOs generate a need to borrow [Pd + CT ]q. Hence the ceiling
on q is given by
q ≤ Rd
(1 + id)(Pd + CT )
(2)
We focus on the case where the wholesalers do not find it profitable to borrow from banks to
finance oil purchase if they have access to DOT loans.8
Taking the price of DOs (besides conjectured aggregate quantity Q− of other wholesalers)
as given, each wholesaler decides q, how many DOs to purchase. This is chosen to maximize
profit
PT (Q− + q)q − (1 + id)(Pd + CT )q (3)
subject to (2).
We can then solve for an equilibrium in the game played between wholesalers, taking DO
price Pd as given. This generates the derived demand function for DOs from wholesalers. The
DO price is determined by equating aggregate demand from wholesalers with aggregate supply
from DOTs.9
To ensure that the market does not shut down, we assume
α > (1 + ib) [Pm + Cr + Cd + CT ] (4)
3.1 The Standard Model without Credit Rationing
If loan default sanctions (Rd, Rb) are large enough, the credit ceilings will not be binding. Then
each wholesaler maximizes profit (3) without being subject to any quantity constraint. Since
the interest rate charged by the banks is higher, the wholesalers do not have any incentives to
8We discuss the implications of this assumption with and without credit rationing below.
9This is based on the standard assumption underlying the Cournot model that an auctioneer clears the market
(for DOs between DOTs and wholesalers). We conjecture the same equilibrium will result in the absence of
an auctioneer, as in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) where DOTs choose their capacity first, and then engage in
Bertrand competition in selling DOs in conjunction with loans to wholesalers.
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borrow from banks.
A symmetric equilibrium among wholesalers results in consumer price
PT = α
[
1− NT
NT + δ
]
+
NT
NT + δ
(1 + id) (Pd + CT ) (5)
implying a pass-through rate of NT
NT+δ
which is rising in NT , and converging to 1 as NT ap-
proaches ∞.
Having solved for the equilibrium at the wholesaler level resulting from any given DO price,
we can roll back to the earlier stage where DOTs make quantity decisions. Combining (5) and
(3) we obtain the derived demand function facing DOTs:
Pd(Q) =
1
1 + id
[
α− NT + δ
NT
ηQδ
]
− CT (6)
The profit of a representative DOT selecting DO quantity q when the remaining DOTs select
a total of Q− when Pr is the price at which DOs can be bought:
[Pd(Q− + q)− Pr − Cd] q (7)
Routine calculations yield the following expression for the symmetric equilibrium selling price
of DOs
Pd =
[
α
1 + id
− CT
][
1− Nd
Nd + δ
]
+
Nd
Nd + δ
[Pr + Cd] (8)
Using (5), this in turn implies a downstream price of
PT = α
[
1− NT
NT + δ
Nd
Nd + δ
]
+
NT
NT + δ
Nd
Nd + δ
(1 + id) (Pr + Cd + CT ) (9)
if Pr is the price at which DOTs buy DOs.
Proceeding in similar fashion back to the refiner level, we can solve for the equilibrium Pr
and end up with the following expression for wholesale (and also retail) price as a function of
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oil import price:
PT = α
[
1− NT
NT + δ
Nd
Nd + δ
Nr
Nr + δ
]
+
NT
NT + δ
Nd
Nd + δ
Nr
Nr + δ
(1+ id)(Pm+Cr +Cd+CT ) (10)
The pass-through of oil import price to the consumer price is the product of σi across
successive layers, where σi ≡ NiNi+δ is a measure of competitiveness in layer i. The downstream
price is a convex combination of the demand intercept α and total unit cost (aggregating
import, refining, distribution and financing costs). Rising competitiveness at any layer raises
the pass-through rate and lowers the consumer price (given (4)).
What does this model predict about the effects of a reform which bans the entire DOT
layer from functioning? Then wholesalers buy directly from refiners, financing their purchase by
borrowing from banks instead of the DOTs.10 Under the assumption of no credit rationing (i.e.,
wholesalers face no credit ceilings in borrowing from banks, as Rb is large enough), wholesaler
per unit costs rise owing to a rise in the borrowing interest rate from id to ib. This tends to
raise the wholesale price. On the other hand, the reduction in concentration at the DOT layer
has an opposite effect of lowering PT . Moreover, DOT costs Cd are no longer incurred. The net
effect on the wholesale (and consumer) price is ambiguous, depending on the relative strength
of either effect (i.e., the size of ib − id compared with Nd and Cd).11 The post-reform price is
given by
PˆT = α
[
1− NT
NT + δ
Nr
Nr + δ
]
+
NT
NT + δ
Nr
Nr + δ
(1 + ib)(Pm + Cr + CT ) (11)
Although the net effect on consumer prices is uncertain, the above model yields unambiguous
predictions regarding the changes in both the intercept of the price equation and the pass-
through rate following the reform. The intercept term becomes smaller while the pass-through
10The underlying assumption is that following the ban DOTs are not just unable to trade in oil, but also lend
to wholesalers. This is plausible as a large part of the loanable funds of DOTs are funded by their profits from
buying and selling DOs. Moreover, in a dynamic setting the sanctions DOTs impose on defaulting wholesalers
involved refusing to sell them any DOs. Such sanctions cannot be used if DOTs are banned from functioning
in the oil market.
11The effect of elimination of Cd is likely to be small, as the DOTS do not take physical delivery of oils,
transport and storage costs incurred by them is zero.
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rate of the oil import price to PT must go up as a result of the reform, as concentration declines
and the interest cost of wholesalers rise (ib > id). Post-reform the pass-through rate equals
NT
NT+δ
Nr
Nr+δ
(1+ib), as against
NT
NT+δ
Nd
Nd+δ
Nr
Nr+δ
(1+id) prior to the reform, and the intercept declines
from α
[
1− NT
NT+δ
Nd
Nd+δ
Nr
Nr+δ
]
to α
[
1− NT
NT+δ
Nr
Nr+δ
]
following the reform. These predictions can
be tested empirically.
3.2 The Model with Binding Credit Constraints
When default sanctions Rd, Rb are low enough, the credit constraint (2) is likely to bind. Then
the best response of a representative wholesaler to DO price Pd and aggregate quantity Q− of
all other wholesalers in the pre-reform situation is
q(Q−, Pd) = min{q¯(Pd), q∗(Q−, Pd)} (12)
where
q¯(Pd) =
Rd
(1 + id)(Pd + CT )
(13)
is the constrained demand where the credit constraint binds, while q∗(Q,Pd) denotes the cor-
responding unconstrained demand, which is the value of q that solves the first order condition
α− (1 + id) (Pd + CT ) = η
[
(Q− + q)δ + δq(Q− + q)δ−1
]
(14)
The implicit assumption in the above formulation is that the wholesalers borrow from the
DOTs, but do not borrow from the banks in the pre-reform period even when they are quantity
rationed. This is a plausible assumption when the amount of credit offered by the DOTs (Rd) is
not too small, and the interest rate differential between the bank loans and DOT loans (ib− id)
is large enough.12
12This simplifies the exposition. The conclusions regarding pricing and pass-through implications of credit
provision by DOTs in relaxing the credit constraint faced by downstream traders are robust to the alternative
assumption that, in the initial equilibrium, the wholesalers use both DOT and Bank credit, but still face binding
credit constraint.
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The credit constraint does not bind in the symmetric equilibrium if
NT
NT + δ
1
η
[α− (1 + id)(Pd + CT )] ≤
[
NTRd
(1 + id)(Pd + CT )
]δ
(15)
while if this condition is violated, the symmetric equilibrium with a binding credit constraint
involves each wholesaler selecting
q¯ =
Rd
(1 + id)(Pd + CT )
(16)
The residual demand curve facing DOTs is now
Pd(Q) =
1
Q
NTRd
1 + id
− CT (17)
instead of (6). The resulting Cournot equilibrium among DOTs given Pr is
Pd = (1− 1
Nd
)−1(Pr + Cd)− CT (18)
which yields a Cournot equilibrium among refiners that ultimately results in consumer price
PT = α− η
[(
1− 1
Nr
)(
1− 1
Nd
)
NTRd
(1 + id) (Pm + Cr + Cd)
]δ
(19)
In contrast to the case where the credit constraint does not bind, this is nonlinear, with the
pass-through rate no longer independent of the crude import price.
The marginal pass-through rate equals
∂PT
∂Pm
= ηδ
[(
1− 1
Nr
)(
1− 1
Nd
)
NTRd
(1 + id)
]δ
[Pm + Cr + Cd]
−(1+δ) (20)
which is increasing in Rd. A decline in credit limit (i.e., Rd) shifts the residual demand curve
facing DOTs inward, and reduces the sensitivity of the consumer prices to changes in oil refining
costs.
Following the DOT ban, wholesalers borrow from banks at a higher interest rate ib and are
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subject to lower credit limit Rb
1+ib
. If credit constraints were binding in the pre-reform situation,
they will continue to bind following the reform. The resulting equilibrium will involve
PˆT = α− η
[(
1− 1
Nr
)
NTRb
(1 + ib)(Pm + Cr)
]δ
(21)
and a marginal pass-through rate
∂PˆT
∂Pm
= ηδ
[(
1− 1
Nr
)
NTRb
(1 + ib)
]δ
[Pm + Cr]
−(1+δ) (22)
The greater severity of credit constraints ( Rb
1+ib
< Rd
1+id
) now reduces the pass-through rate, which
counters the increase owing to lowered concentration (equivalent to Nd → ∞) and reduction
in dealer costs (Cd → 0). If the former effect is strong enough, the pass-through rate can now
decline. The intensification of credit constraints also tends to raise the general level of PT , i.e.,
the estimated intercept term, by shifting the oil supply curve inwards. The predictions about
the effects of the reform on the intercept of the price equation and the the pass-through rate
are thus opposite to the standard model when credit contraction due to DOT ban is strong
enough: the intercept goes up while pass-through declines after the reform.
4 Estimation Strategy
We utilize daily data on crude palm import price and domestic wholesale price to estimate the
pass-through equation and how it changed following the reform. In order to test the standard
model, we would ideally estimate the following equation
P kt = γk + βkPtm + βkCt + ϵt (23)
analogous to equations (10, 11), where k = b, a refers to the regime (before and after the reform
respectively), t denotes the date, the dependent variable P kt is the wholesale price during regime
k, the regressor Ptm is the crude palm import price, and Ct denotes the sum of refining and
distribution costs. The pass-through rate βk equals the product of competition variables
Ni
Ni+δ
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across various stages, and the interest rate at which wholesalers borrow. The key prediction of
the standard double marginalization model is that βa > βb, owing to a rise in competition and
the interest rate following the DOT ban. The change in the intercept γa− γb is of independent
interest, as it helps estimate the effect of the reform on the level of downstream prices. The
standard model predicts that γa − γb < 0. Hence we are interested in a regression of the form
Pt = θ0 + θ1dR + θ2[Ptm + Ct] + θ3dR∗[Ptm + Ct] + ϵt (24)
where dR is a regime dummy (1 after the reform, 0 before), and identifying the signs of coeffi-
cients of the reform dummy θ1(= γa−γb) and its interaction with the import price θ3(= βa−βb).
We refer to this as the before-after (B-A) regression.
The key difficulty is that we do not have data on costs of refiners, and financing and distri-
bution costs of wholesalers. If these costs are correlated with the import price, the estimated
pass-through rate will be biased. We deal with this problem in a number of different ways.
We could rely on plausible assumptions concerning correlation between the omitted variables
and the oil import price. Recall that our main interest is to infer the direction of change in
the pass-through rate, i.e., the sign of θ3. Denoting the coefficient on oil import price in a
regression of Ct on Ptm by ρk in regime k, the estimated pass-through rate is βˆk = βk(1 + ρk).
If the correlation between Ct and Ptm did not change as a result of the reform, i.e., ρa = ρb,
we can infer the direction of change in pass-through rate from a before after comparison. More
generally, if ρa ≥ ρb and ρa ≥ 0, we have βˆa < βˆb only if βa < βb, contrary to the prediction
of the standard DMR model. Hence under this assumption we would be able to still reject the
standard model despite the lack of cost data, if the estimated pass-through rate falls after the
reform.
Data on diesel prices provides evidence in favor of the assumption that ρa ≥ ρb and ρa ≥ 0.
The correlation between diesel price and crude oil import price was virtually zero in pre-
reform period as government controls decoupled the domestic diesel price from fluctuations in
international prices. During the post-reform period, the correlation was 0.45 as international
oil prices eased, whence the government allowed more flexibility in price setting at gas stations.
A limitation of this approach is that the correlation of the oil import price with other
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sources of domestic processing and distribution costs cannot be assessed. Moreover, it does not
permit any inferences concerning changes in the intercept term, which is relevant to assessing
the impact of the reform on the level of downstream prices. The bias in the B-A estimate of
the intercept term in regime k equals βkC
0
k where C
0
k =
(
C¯k − ρkP¯mk
)
denotes the intercept
term in the regression of distribution costs Ct on the crude oil import price Ptm in regime k.
Inferring the direction of change in the intercept term is therefore not possible, without making
assumptions regarding the before-after difference in average distribution costs.
An alternative way of dealing with the bias in the B-A estimates is to control for variables
that proxy for refining and distribution costs, such as the diesel price and exchange rate.13 We
shall examine the robustness of the estimates with respect to these controls.
A second approach would be to compare price movements in palm oil with another com-
modity such as wheat which is primarily imported from abroad in Bangladesh, and subject to
similar transport and storage costs. This would amount to a DiD regression using data which
pools oil and wheat:
Pt = θ0 + θ1dR + θ2Ptm + θ3(dR∗Ptm) + λ1dO + λ2(dO∗Ptm) + λ3(dO∗dR∗Ptm) + ϵ∗t (25)
where dO denotes an oil dummy, and the prices Pt and Ptm now include both palm oils and
wheat. Then λ2 and λ3 would provide estimates of the reform effect on the intercept and pass-
through rates in oil. Since the storage rental rates and transport rates do not vary across palm
oil and wheat, the distribution costs in oil and wheat will be positively correlated over time,
and the estimates from the DiD design will be less biased than the before-after regression using
data on oil alone.
A final issue in assessing the effects of the reform on pass-through rate is a possible con-
founding effect of changes in bank interest rate in the post-reform period because of factors
unrelated to the reform such as central bank policy. According to our benchmark model with-
out credit rationing, the pass-through rate in the post-reform period depends on the interest
13Most of the trucks run on diesel and the privately owned electricity generators also use diesel. Electricity
outage and load shedding were common in Bangladesh during the study period. Since almost all transport
equipment are imported into Bangladesh, exchange rate changes can directly affect a major component of costs
in the transport sector.
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rate charged by the banks, as the wholesalers deprived of the credit from DOTs turn to banks
for financing their purchases. If the bank interest rate falls significantly due to central bank
policy independent of the policy reform in edible oils market, it is conceivable that the interest
rate paid by wholesalers fell compared to the pre-reform period. We shall therefore examine
this possibility using data on interest rates on short-term bank loans.
5 Data and Empirical Results
We use daily price data for palm oil and wheat at various stages of the supply chain from
the Department of Agricultural Marketing (DAM) unit of Ministry of Agriculture, Bangladesh
Government. These data are very similar to daily price data reported by The Trading Corpo-
ration of Bangladesh (TCB) for major urban centers. We utilize the DAM data owing to longer
coverage and across multiple commodities. Daily international prices of wheat are derived from
the data stream of Chicago Board of Trading. Crude palm oil price data is obtained from
the Malaysian Palm oil Board.14 Lentil import prices are taken from the National Bureau of
Revenue daily import data. Our sample extends from January 24, 2008 to October 4, 2012.
There are however some data gaps due to lack of price data during weekends and holidays as
well as some missing data in the DAM original data set. Our total sample sizes for palm oil
and wheat are 966 days spread over 57 months.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for wholesale, retail and import prices of palm oil and
wheat prior to the reform. Figure 1 plots wholesale price data for palm oil along with the crude
import price over the the main sample period used for estimation. The close co-movement
between the two series is apparent, with a margin that moves counter-cyclically, suggesting a
pass-through rate between 0 and 1. The two vertical lines in the middle of 2011 correspond to
dates of announcement and implementation of the reform. The international price was rising
continuously from late 2008 onwards, until a few months prior to the onset of the reform. This
was reversed thereafter immediately for a few months following the reform. Despite this the
retail price remained stationary, resulting in an increase in the margin, and suggesting that the
14Crude palm oil was listed in the TCB in January 2009. We compared TCB data with Malaysian Palm
Board data on daily palm oil prices, there are nearly identical.
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pass-through rate had declined following the reform.
Figure 2 shows the behavior of wholesale price indices for palm and wheat over time (the
base is May 31, 2009). In the pre-reform period, the wheat price index is consistently higher
than the palm price index, and the trend in wheat price tracks that in palm oils price well.
This pattern breaks down in the post-reform period. The wheat price index is falling in the
period immediately following the announcement and implementation of the reform, but the
palm price index remains stationary. This suggests that palm price pass-through fell compared
to the pass-through in wheat price.
Figure 3 compares movements in wholesale trading margins for palm oil and wheat. Prior
to the reform, the two tend to move together, with the troughs and peaks in wheat margin
tracking those in palm margin well.15 A widening gap between the margins opens up in the
post reform period, with the margin in palm oil higher. Table 2 provides average wholesale
and retail margins for the two commodities both before and after the reform. Margins are
computed either using the current or 4-week lagged import price. We see a 25% or higher rise
in oil margins while the wheat margin fell slightly. Figure 4 shows the margin estimates, both
at the wholesale and retail levels, and the 95 percent confidence interval, providing suggestive
evidence that the increase in the oil margin relative to the wheat margin after the reform is
statistically and economically significant.
Table 3 presents the results of the B-A and DiD regressions for the wholesale price as the
dependent variable and the 4-week lagged import price as the independent variable of interest.
We check the robustness of the results later with alternative lags for import price.16 The
regressions include year and quarter dummies, and a dummy for the Ramadan period when food
prices tend to spike. We exclude data for the few months between the date of announcement and
implementation of the reform.17 Data for two years prior to the announcement are compared
with data following policy implementation. Based on a correlogram analysis of price data, we
15The margins are calculated using 4-week lagged international price to reflect the transport and processing
lag. Our main empirical estimates also focus on the pass-through of 4-week lagged international prices.
16The 4-week lag is chosen to reflect the fact that it takes about 10-14 days to transport the crude oil from
Malaysia to Chittagong port after an order is placed, and then the oil needs to be transported to the mills and
refined which require approximately 2 more weeks. The conclusions of this paper, however, do not depend on
this particular lag assumption. See the evidence based on alternative lags below.
17Later we show that the conclusions are robust to the inclusion of data for these months in the sample.
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allow for an AR (1) process in the residuals. The null hypothesis of a unit root in the residual
is rejected at the 1 percent level by augmented Dickey-Fuller and Panel unit root tests for all
of the price regressions reported in this paper. For example, for the DiD regressions, the Im,
Pesaran and Shin (2003) test rejects the null hypothesis of unit root in the residuals for both
oil and wheat at the 1 percent level against the alternative hypothesis that at least one of them
is stationary. The evidence against the null hypothesis of unit root in the panel of residuals is
confirmed by the Breitung (2000) and Harris and Tzavalis (1999) tests where the alternative
hypothesis is that both palm and wheat residuals are stationary. Standard errors are corrected
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the Newey-West (1987) procedure.
The B-A regression shows a significant fall in the pass-through rate following the reform,
and a significant rise in the intercept term. According to the B-A estimates without proxies for
distribution costs (column 1 of Table 3), the pass-through rate declines from a point estimate
of 0.81 to 0.62, while the point estimate of the intercept term rises from 22 to 41. This is
inconsistent with the model of the supply chain without credit rationing, and consistent with
predictions of the credit rationing model.
Next we address concerns regarding the extent to which this could have resulted from
omission of distribution costs. The B-A estimates of the effects of the reform become larger
when we include diesel price and exchange rate as proxies for distribution costs (see column 2
of Table 3). This suggests that the omitted distribution costs results in underestimation of the
effects of the reform on palm price. The results are reinforced in the DiD regression (column
3 without controls, and column 4 with controls): the fall in the pass-through rate and the rise
in the intercept are both larger compared to the corresponding B-A estimates. The evidence
that the fall in pass-through rate after the DOT ban is underestimated in the B-A regression
is consistent with the assumption that the omitted distribution costs were positively correlated
with import price in the post-reform period, and the correlation remained unchanged or became
stronger in the post reform period. The fact that the increase in intercept is underestimated in
the B-A on the other hand suggests that the combined effect of a higher crude import price and
a higher ρ after reform is strong enough to make C0a < C
0
b . A comparison of the DiD estimates
in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 shows that, unlike the B-A estimates, the DiD estimates are
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not affected substantially when proxies of distribution costs are included. This suggests that
the DiD design accounts for the omitted distribution costs well.
Table 4A shows that the results are robust with respect to alternative lags for the oil import
price.18 These correspond to alternative hypotheses concerning the way refiners set prices for
refined oil, based on historic or current cost, and alternative specifications of the lag between the
time of import of crude oil and sale of refined oil. Longer lags weaken the BA regression results
(which nevertheless remain statistically significant), while the DiD estimates are comparatively
unaffected. The first two columns of Table 4B shows that the results continue to hold when the
pre-reform sample is expanded to include three rather than two years. Columns 3 and 4 show
they also hold when we include the ‘announcement’ period between the announcement and
implementation dates, with separate intercept and pass-through interaction dummies for the
announcement period included in the regression (estimated coefficients of these are not shown
in the table).
The exact period for which the reform lasted is unclear, as the ban on operation of DOTs
unraveled gradually a few months after implementation. According to informal accounts, the
reform was in place for slightly less than a year. The first two columns of Table 5 thus separates
the post-reform period into the first 9 months following the reform, from the post-9 month
period. Both B-A and DiD results show that the effects were concentrated in the first 9
months; the post-9 month period is statistically indistinguishable from the pre-reform period.
Not surprisingly, the first 9-month effects are larger in magnitude compared to previous tables
which pooled all post-reform dates into a single post-reform period. The last two columns of
Table 5 separates the first 6 months following the reform with the post-6-month period. The
BA results are similar to those in the first two columns, while the DiD results show some effects
on the intercept term lingering even during the post-6-month period.
Table 6A tests the parallel trend assumption underlying the analysis. We move the reform
date to one year prior to the actual reform, whereupon the significant effects in both BA and
DiD regressions in Table 3 disappear. Table 6B carries out an alternative placebo test, replacing
18The specification used in Tables 4A-7B correspond to specification in odd columns in Table 3 without diesel
price and exchange rate as additional controls. The results are similar if we include the proxies for distribution
costs, and they are available upon request.
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oil with lentil, a different commodity whose supply chain was not affected by the reform. The
corresponding DiD results show no effect of the oil reform.
Our analysis predicts that the reform affected the wholesale margin but did not directly
affect the wholesale-retail margin, since it affected DOTs who intermediated between the re-
finers and the wholesalers. This would imply that the effects on the retail margin (retail price
less the oil import price) would be similar to those of the wholesale margin. Table 7A presents
results for the retail margin. These are very similar to the results in Table 3 for the wholesale
margin. Table 7B shows that the effects for the first 9 months following the reform had similar
but somewhat larger effects on the retail margin (compared with the effects on the wholesale
margin shown in Table 5A).
6 Supplementary Evidence and Alternative Explanations
In this section, we provide additional evidence consistent with our finding of an increase in the
wholesale price of palm oil resulting from intensified credit constraints of wholesalers following
the reform. Choudhury and Clara Costa (2012) provide case studies of the experience of two
refiners (Nurjahan Group and Bangladesh Edible Oils Limited) following the reform. Owing
to a drop in demand from wholesalers, these two refiners accumulated excess inventory, and
thereafter lowered their imports of crude oil by 39% between 2010 and 2011. Consistent with
this account, aggregate imports of crude oil for Bangladesh as a whole fell following the reform:
see Figure 5 which plots monthly imports for 2009-10 and 2010-11. A simple before-after
regression indicates a statistically significant decline following the reform (the coefficient of
reform dummy is -20.15 which is significant at the 5 percent level (t=2.026)). It is striking that
this happened during a period when world oil prices were declining, reversing the trend for the
previous three years (see Figure 1).
In 2013, two years following the reform, we conducted a survey of edible oil traders in
the Dhaka and Chittagong markets (Emran et al. (2015)). Data on 6176 transactions between
DOTs and wholesalers revealed that 30% of transactions between DOTs and wholesalers were on
credit, and supplier credit from DOTs accounted for 32 percent of the volume. A retrospective
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survey we conducted in February 2016 of a sub-sample of 50 wholesalers in these markets
indicated that wholesalers buying on credit from DOTs prior to the reform experienced a 45%
reduction in volumes. This suggests that aggregate supply at the wholesale level dropped
by approximately 15% after the reform owing to the difficulties faced by wholesale traders
in obtaining credit in the post-reform period. There are no reliable estimates of the price
elasticity of retail demand for palm oil in Bangladesh, the estimate for USA is 1.24 (Kojima
et al. (2014)), and 1.62 for India (Srinivasan (2005). The evidence is consistent with the
notion that the elasticity is higher in poorer countries. A plausible estimate for the elasticity in
Bangladesh is 1.7-1.8. This yields a back-of-the-envelope estimate of a price increase of 8.33%
- 8.80% owing to the 15% quantity reduction after reform. The DiD estimates in column (4) of
Table 3 imply that the wholesale price was 9.8 percent higher as a result of credit contraction
following DOT ban (evaluated at the average world price in post-reform period).
A possible alternative explanation of the lower pass-through rate estimated after the reform
is that the wholesalers always relied on banks for credit and the interest rate charged by banks
declined after the reform because of central bank policy shift. A lower interest rate would
reduce the pass-through estimate according to our benchmark model without credit rationing.
However, it turns out that the average bank interest rate was higher in the post reform period;
the average interest rate on short-term bank loans increased from 11.46 to 13.38 in the post-
reform period.
Another possible explanation of the rise in wholesale price is that the reform increased the
market power of refiners who were selling directly to wholesalers, rather than indirectly through
the DOTs prior to the reform. This would have implied an increase in total profits earned by
refiners, who would have an interest in ensuring that the reform was not reversed. Interviews
with refiners and traders, as well as the retrospective survey of 50 traders we conducted in
February 2016 instead report that refiners who were unhappy with the reform (owing to the
limited take up from wholesale dealers) surreptitiously went back to the DOTs to oﬄoad their
accumulated inventory. This indicates that the refiners’ profit was adversely affected by the
reform, consistent with the prediction of the credit rationing model.
Explanations based on increased search costs are also unlikely to account for a price increase
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resulting from the reform.19 These search costs did not seem significant prior to the reform,
as DOTs operate within a very narrow market area in Dhaka and Chittagong, and wholesalers
could find out prices quoted by DOTs by making a telephone call to their contacts in these
market areas. Following the reform, there were only nine refiners from whom they could
purchase; knowing what prices they were charging would have been even easier than checking
prices charged by the 300-400 DOTs previously.
7 Related Literature
The evidence and analysis presented in this paper are most closely related to a large litera-
ture on imperfect pass-through of international prices and exchange rate variations to domestic
producer and consumer prices (e.g., recent contributions by Goldberg and Hellerstein (2008),
Nakamura (2008), Nakamura and Zerom (2010), Gopinath et. al. (2010), Berman et al. (2012),
Bonnet et al. (2013), and recent surveys by Burstein and Gopinath (2013), Campa and Gold-
berg (2008)). Weyl and Fabinger (2013) presents a unifying framework for incidence with
imperfect competition. This framework has been fruitfully utilized in the context of developing
countries by Atkin and Donaldson (2015). Analogous to our approach, they use the Bulow-
Pfleiderer (1983) specification of demand to derive a constant pass-through rate that depends
only on market concentration and demand curvature. They use this to recover trade costs from
spatial price differences. As in the standard model, intermediaries in their model play a role
in trade and physical distribution rather than financing, and contract frictions such as credit
constraints have no role.
The literature in development economics has paid more attention to contracting frictions,
resulting from adverse selection, moral hazard and enforcement problems. Models of interlinked
trade-credit relationships have appeared in Braverman and Stiglitz (1984), Bardhan (1984,
1989). Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) show that relative illiquidity of commodities implies that
it is easier to provide trade credit compared to a pure credit contract. This argument is relevant
for our application, because a DO is considerably less liquid than money, as it may not be easy
19Chau et. al. (2016) and Casaburi et al (2013) emphasize search costs in a context where small farmers
search for best price offer.
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for a wholesaler to find a DO buyer willing to pay cash without offering significant discounts.
More important, the DOTs rely on accumulated information about the wholesalers to minimize
adverse selection and moral hazard, and default information is shared quickly among the DOTs
in a market, similar to multilateral punishment scheme a la Greif (1993). Information and
monitoring advantages have been identified as important factors for supplier credit (see, for
example, Smith (1987)).
Recent empirical work in developing countries on intermediaries and commodity supply
chains have examined pass-through of international or retail prices to farm-gate prices when
trade intermediaries operate as middlemen between farmers and retail or foreign buyers (Casaburi
et al. (2013), Fafchamps and Hill (2008), Minten and Kyle (1999)). Many of these focus on
search frictions to explain pass-through patterns, while Mitra et. al. (2016) consider impli-
cations of asymmetric price information. The role of intermediaries in providing trade credit
does not appear in these papers. Our paper therefore provides an interesting complement to
this literature.
Although there has been a renewed interest in the domestic food markets in developing
countries in response to price shocks in the international market, most studies (e.g., Ivanic
et. al. (2012)) estimate the effects of higher international prices on domestic prices (pass-
through) in reduced form regressions without a theoretical model, and the focus is usually
on the implications of higher consumer prices for poverty. These studies do not attempt to
understand the role of intermediaries or the effects of efforts to regulate their activities.
8 Concluding Comments
This paper extends the model of vertical supply chain with imperfect competition to incorporate
financing intermediaries who relax binding quantitative credit constraint faced by downstream
traders. Such credit rationing lowers price elasticity of the demand curves that upstream market
agents face. More stringent credit constraints lower the rate at which international prices pass
through to domestic wholesale prices.
To discriminate between the models of supply chain with and without quantitative credit
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rationing, we study a policy experiment in Bangladesh where the government banned a layer
of financial intermediaries in edible oils market called Delivery Order Traders (DOTs) in 2011.
The reform was motivated by widely held belief that these intermediaries exert market power
and keep the prices paid by consumers high even when the international prices are falling, by
lowering the pass-through rate. The reform would be expected to increase the pass-through
rate and reduce the marketing margin of traders in a standard double marginalization model
without quantitative credit rationing. In sharp contrast, the reform is likely to reduce pass-
through rate and increase the marketing margins if the role played by the DOTs before the
reform is to provide credit to wholesalers and relax their binding credit constraints.
The empirical analysis based on a difference-in-difference design with wheat as the com-
parison commodity shows that, contrary to the expectations of the policy makers, the reform
raised consumer prices. It reduced the pass-through rate of falling international prices after
the reform, and increased the intercept of the marketing margin equation. The evidence of a
lower pass-through and higher intercept rejects the standard double marginalization model of
pass-through in imperfectly competitive marketing chain widely used in the literature, and is
consistent with the predictions from the model with quantitative credit rationing. The evi-
dence and analysis presented here suggest that credit market frictions and quantitative credit
rationing are important for a better understanding of the transmission of international prices
to domestic wholesale and retail prices.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics 
 Main Sample Full Sample 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Palm       
Wholesale price  80.07 15.31 77.85 16.23 
Retail price  84.27 16.19 82.05 16.77 
World Price (4-week lagged) 68.54 15.50 64.20 18.03 
World Price (Current) 69.31 15.26 64.44 17.93 
Wheat     
Wholesale price  21.62 3.90 22.41 4.91 
Retail price  24.22 3.97 25.29 5.19 
World Price (4-week lagged) 16.06 3.48 16.34 3.85 
World Price (Current) 16.39 3.73 16.51 3.98 
Notes: (1) The “Main Sample” Includes 2 years from pre-reform period, “Full Sample” spans 3 year and 2 months 
before reform period. The announcement period (90 days) is excluded from both.  The Main Sample covers May 3, 
2009 to October 4, 2012, and the Full Sample covers from January 24, 2008 to October 4, 2012. (2) Unit for Palm is 
Litre, and for Wheat Kg. (3)  All prices are in the local currency, Taka. 
 
Table 2:  Wholesale and Retail Trading Margins for Palm Oils and Wheat 
 Palm Margins Wheat Margins 
 Before After  Difference T-stat Before After  Difference T-stat 
 Intervention Intervention   Intervention Intervention  
 4-week Lagged World Price (taka/kg; taka/litre) 
World-Retail Margin        
Mean 13.57 18.31 4.74 13.76 8.43 7.84 -0.59 3.08 
Standard 
Dev. 4.24 4.39   2.22 2.56   
World-Wholesale Margin        
Mean 10.42 12.86 2.44 6.41 5.86 5.21 -0.65 3.51 
Standard 
Dev. 4.37 5.19   2.34 2.27   
 Current World Price (taka/kg; taka/litre) 
World-Retail Margin        
Mean 11.74 18.81 7.07 16.67 8.16 7.44 -0.72 3.50 
Standard 
Dev. 4.72 5.92   2.11 3.04   
World-Wholesale Margin        
Mean 8.59 13.36 4.77 11.45 5.59 4.81 -0.78 4.10 
Standard 
Dev. 4.77 5.69   2.02 2.75   
NOTE: (1) Estimates from the “Main Sample” which excludes the announcement period (90 days), and covers from 
May 3, 2009 to October 4, 2012.  (2) Unit for Palm is Litre, and for Wheat Kg.  (3) All margins are in Taka. 
 
Table 3:  Effects of Policy Reform on Palm Oil Wholesale Prices 
  Estimated Effects From 
 Before- After Difference in Difference 
 (1) (2) (3)  
     
Reform Dummy  18.92*** 23.51***   
 (3.113) (3.79)   
Reform Dummy * Palm World Price -0.179** -0.211**   
 (-2.459) (2.97)   
Palm World Price  0.805*** 0.766***   
 (17.79) (15.84)   
Reform Dummy   -3.150*** -2.670*** 
   (-4.633) (-2.838) 
Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy   24.38*** 25.36*** 
   (7.348) (7.740) 
Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy* World Price  -0.217*** -0.228*** 
   (-5.039) (-5.343) 
Palm Dummy*World Price   0.105** 0.147*** 
   (2.066) (2.762) 
World Price   0.643*** 0.586*** 
   (11.30) (9.782) 
Palm Dummy   14.30*** 14.39*** 
   (13.19) (13.18) 
Intercept 21.88*** 60.77*** 14.42*** 22.70*** 
 (5.126) (2.918) (9.544) (1.537) 
Observations 631 631 1262 1262 
Year and Quarter dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ramadan Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Proxies for Distribution Costs No Yes No Yes 
Notes: (1) The sample consists of 2 years from the pre-reform period, and the announcement phase is  
excluded.  (2) World Price Includes Both Palm and Wheat.  (3) Unit for Palm is Litre and for Wheat Kg. 
(4) Proxies for distribution costs are diesel price and exchange rate.  (5) Standard errors are in Parenthesis, 
 and are corrected using Newey-West (1987) procedure for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, assuming 
AR (1) process.  (6) Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Panel Unit Root Tests Reject the Null Hypothesis  
of Unit Roots in the Residuals. (7) *** denotes significant at the 1 percent, and ** at the 10 percent level. 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 4A:  Effects of Reform on Wholesale Price of Palm Oil:  Robustness to Alternative Lags in 
Crude Palm Oil Price (Dependent Variable: Wholesale Price) 
 No Lag 8-Week Lag 
 
Before- 
After 
Difference in 
Difference 
Before- 
After 
Difference in 
Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Reform Dummy 23.95***  13.64*  
 (5.527)  (7.031)  
Reform Dummy*Palm World 
Price -0.237***  -0.168*  
 (0.064)  (0.089)  
Palm World Price 0.742***  0.645***  
  (0.033)   (0.070)   
Reform Dummy  -4.013***  -4.352*** 
  (0.698)  (0.762) 
Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy   29.28***  26.06*** 
  (3.779)  (4.813) 
Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy* 
World Price of Palm and Wheat  -0.245***  -0.269*** 
  (0.048)  (0.063) 
World Price of Palm and 
Wheat*Palm Dummy  0.132**  0.285*** 
  (0.063)  (0.062) 
World Price of Palm and Wheat  0.545***  0.446*** 
    (0.068)   (0.067) 
Palm Dummy  15.98***  14.35*** 
  (1.186)  (1.893) 
Intercept 25.79*** 16.41*** 40.77*** 20.23*** 
  (3.186) (1.758) (6.069) (1.705) 
Observations 631 1,262 631 1,262 
Year and Quarter dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ramadan Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: (1) The sample consists of 2 years from the pre-reform period, and the announcement phase is excluded.   
(2) The Comparison for DiD is Wheat.  World Price Includes Both Palm and Wheat. (3) Unit for Palm is Litre and 
for Wheat Kg. (3) Standard Errors are corrected using Newey-West (1987) procedure for heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation, assuming AR (1) error process.  t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4B: Robustness with Respect to Sample Used for Estimation (Dependent Variable: 
Wholesale Price) 
 
Full Sample  
(3 Years Pre-Reform Period) 
Including Announcement 
in Sample 
 Before- After 
Difference in 
Difference 
Before- 
After 
Difference in 
Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Reform Dummy  19.68***  22.76***  
 (5.397)  (5.919)  
Reform Dummy*Palm World Price -0.184***  -0.221***  
 (0.0650)  (0.0709)  
Palm World Price  0.682***  0.817***  
  (0.0387)   (0.0437)   
Reform Dummy  -1.083  -3.128*** 
  (0.741)  (0.534) 
Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy  25.18***  26.15*** 
  (3.478)  (3.278) 
Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy *World Price 
of Palm and Wheat 
 
-0.240***  -0.233*** 
  (0.0459)  (0.0425) 
World Price of Palm and Wheat*Palm Dummy  0.0513  0.104** 
  (0.0490)  (0.0441) 
World Price of Palm and Wheat  0.658***  0.647*** 
    (0.0590)   (0.0475) 
Palm Dummy  18.79***  14.22*** 
  (1.316)  (1.080) 
Intercept 37.67*** 16.31*** 20.42*** 14.02*** 
  (2.691) (1.318) (3.958) (1.174) 
Observations 890 1,780 687 1374 
Year and Quarter dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ramadan Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 Notes: (1) The comparison for DiD is Wheat.  (2) The "Full Sample" Excludes the Announcement Period. (3) The 
Announcement Sample Includes 2 years from pre-reform period, and post-reform includes the period between 
announcement and Implementation. (4) Standard errors are corrected using Newey-West (1987) procedure for 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation correction and assuming AR (1) error process. Standard errors are in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 5: Effects of the Reform on Wholesale Palm Oil Prices: Short-run vs. Long-run  
  Estimates of Effects from 
 
Before- 
After 
Difference in 
Difference 
Before- 
After 
Difference in 
Difference 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 Effects in the First 9 months  Effects in the First 6 months  
Reform Dummy  28.24***  31.77***  
 (7.464)  (9.783)  
Reform Dummy*Palm World Price -0.338***  -0.348***  
  (0.0898)   (0.120)   
Reform Dummy  -5.318***  -4.428*** 
  (0.614)  (0.591) 
Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy  33.48***  19.47*** 
  (4.356)  (6.534) 
Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy *World 
Price of Palm and Wheat 
 
-0.328***  -0.129 
    (0.0576)   (0.0884) 
 Effects After First 9 months Effects After First 6 months 
Reform Dummy  -8.065  9.927  
 (8.003)  (6.649)  
Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy *Palm 
World Price  0.0450  -0.126  
  (0.0896)   (0.0789)   
Reform Dummy  -8.374***  -5.231*** 
  (0.993)  (1.082) 
Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy   7.003  11.85** 
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Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy *World 
Price of Palm and Wheat 
 
-0.0162  -0.0820 
    (0.0744)   (0.0623) 
Palm world price 0.778***  0.811***  
  (0.0460)   (0.0478)   
World Price of Palm and Wheat*Palm Dummy  0.133***  0.193*** 
  (0.0508)  (0.0505) 
World Price of Palm and Wheat  0.604***  0.540*** 
  (0.0558)  (0.0562) 
Palm Dummy  14.43***  13.76*** 
    (1.076)   (1.084) 
Intercept 29.38*** 18.48*** 26.02*** 18.95*** 
  (4.309) (1.354) (4.906) (1.685) 
Observations 631 1262 631 1262 
Year and Quarter dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Ramadan Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Notes: (1) The sample consists of 2 years from the pre-reform period, and the announcement phase is excluded.   
(2) The comparison for DiD is Wheat.  (3) Unit for Palm is Litre and for Wheat Kg. (4) Standard errors are corrected 
using Newey-West (1987) procedure for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation correction and assuming AR (1) 
error process. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 6A: Test of the Validity of Parallel Trend in Pre-reform Period: Placebo Policy Date  
(Dep. Variable: Wholesale Price)  
  Before- After Difference in Difference 
  (1) (2) 
    
Placebo Reform Dummy  6.619  
 (13.94)  
Placebo Reform Dummy * Palm 
World Price -0.0163  
 (0.183)  
Palm World Price  0.751***  
  (0.0496)   
Placebo Reform Dummy  1.968*** 
  (0.702) 
Placebo Reform Dummy*Palm 
Dummy  -2.689 
  (8.057) 
Placebo Reform Dummy*Palm 
Dummy* World Price of Palm and 
Wheat  0.0939 
  (0.114) 
Palm Dummy*World Price of Palm 
and Wheat  0.00553 
  (0.0596) 
World Price of Palm and Wheat  0.748*** 
  (0.0669) 
Palm Dummy  15.48*** 
    (1.123) 
Intercept 27.13*** 11.30*** 
  (4.262) (1.312) 
Observations 471 942 
Year and Quarter dummies Yes Yes 
Ramadan Dummies Yes Yes 
Notes: (1) The sample consists of 2 years from the pre-reform period, and the announcement phase is excluded.   
(2) World Price Includes Both Palm and Wheat.  (3) Unit for Palm is Litre and for Wheat Kg. (4) Standard errors are 
corrected using Newey-West (1987) procedure for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation correction and assuming 
AR (1) error process. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 6B: The Effects of the Reform on a Placebo Commodity  
(Placebo Treatment = Lentil, and Control= Wheat) 
(Dep. Variable: Wholesale Price) 
  
Difference in 
Difference 
  (1) 
   
Reform Dummy  -1.002 
 (0.866) 
Reform Dummy* Placebo Treatment 
(Lentil) -11.12 
 (7.385) 
Reform Dummy*Lentil World Price 0.134 
  (0.127) 
World price of Lentil and Wheat*Lentil 
Dummy -0.450*** 
 (0.170) 
World Price of Lentil and Wheat 0.993*** 
 (0.0889) 
Lentil Dummy 34.20*** 
  (7.045) 
Intercept 7.208*** 
  (2.037) 
Observations 1,239 
Year and Quarter dummies Yes 
Ramadan Dummies Yes 
 
Notes: (1) The placebo treatment commodity is Lentil. (2) The sample consists of 2 years from the pre-reform 
period, and the announcement phase is excluded.  (3) Units for Lentil and Wheat are both Kg. (4) Standard errors are 
corrected using Newey-West (1987) procedure for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation correction and assuming 
AR (1) error process. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 7A: Effects of the Reform on Retail Palm Oil Prices 
(Dep. Variable: Retail Price) 
  Before- After Difference in Difference  
  (1) (2)  
    
 
Reform Dummy  14.01***  
 
 (5.377)  
 
Reform Dummy*Palm World Price -0.119*  
 
 (0.0641)  
 
Palm World Price  0.775***  
 
  (0.0385)    
Reform Dummy  -4.263*** 
 
  (0.608) 
 
Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy  26.13*** 
 
  (2.724) 
 
Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy 
*World Price of Palm and Wheat 
 
-0.213*** 
 
  (0.0360) 
 
World Price of Palm and Wheat*Palm 
Dummy 
 
0.145*** 
 
  (0.0477) 
 
World Price of Palm and Wheat  0.604*** 
 
    (0.0524)  
Palm Dummy  14.31*** 
 
   (1.022) 
 
Intercept 29.15*** 18.94***  
  (3.595) (1.340)  
Observations 631 1,262  
Year and Quarter dummies Yes Yes  
Ramadan Dummies Yes Yes  
Notes: (1) The sample consists of 2 years from the pre-reform period, and the announcement phase is excluded.   
 (2) Unit for Palm is Litre and for Wheat Kg. (4) Standard errors are corrected using Newey-West (1987) procedure 
for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation correction and assuming AR (1) error process. Standard errors in 
parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Table 7B: Effects on Retail Margin in the First 9 Months and After 
(Dep. Variable: Retail Price) 
  Before- After Difference in Difference 
  (1) (2) 
 Effects during first 9 months  
Reform Dummy  32.53***  
 (6.677)  
Reform Dummy*Palm World Price -0.384***  
  (0.0816)   
Reform Dummy  -5.558*** 
  (0.619) 
Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy  45.46*** 
  (4.406) 
Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy *World Price of Palm and Wheat  -0.463*** 
    (0.0590) 
 Effects after first 9 months 
Reform Dummy  -11.80*  
 (6.581)  
Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy *Palm World Price  0.121*  
  (0.0713)   
Reform Dummy  -8.106*** 
  (1.027) 
Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy   6.379 
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Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy*World Price of Palm and Wheat  0.0241 
    (0.0522) 
Palm world price 0.769***  
  (0.0399)   
World Price of Palm and Wheat*Palm Dummy  0.152*** 
  (0.0503) 
World Price of Palm and Wheat  0.593*** 
  (0.0550) 
Palm Dummy  14.37*** 
    (1.024) 
Intercept 33.66*** 21.67*** 
  (3.830) (1.358) 
Observations 631 1,262 
Year and Quarter dummies Yes Yes 
Ramadan Dummies Yes Yes 
 Notes: (1) The sample consists of 2 years from the pre-reform period, and the announcement phase is excluded.   
(2) World Price Includes Both Palm and Wheat.  (3) Unit for Palm is Litre and for Wheat Kg. (4) Standard errors are 
corrected using Newey-West (1987) procedure for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation correction and assuming 
AR (1) error process. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 Figure 1: World Market and Wholesale Prices of Palm oil  
 
 
Figure 2: Price Index for Palm and Wheat 
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Figure 3: World-Wholesale Trading Margins: 4-Week lag in World Price 
 
Figure 4: The Effects of the Reform on Trading Margins 
Pre- and Post-Reform Mean and 95 percent Confidence Interval 
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Figure 5: Palm Oil Import ('000 mt) 
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